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Engines of Inequality: Class,
Race, and Family Structure
Amy L. WAX*
I. Introduction
Among those concerned with our country’s future, there is sharp
disagreement over what form of the family is best—for men, women,
children, and society as a whole. this divide finds expression in compet-
ing visions of marriage, sexuality and the family’s place in social life.
Although views run the gamut, the chief positions on these issues may be
characterized as “traditionalist” and “pluralist.”1
traditionalists seek to maintain the institution of marriage as it has con-
ventionally been defined: a life-long, sexually exclusive relationship
between one man and one woman. they regard this relationship as the
preferred setting for bearing and raising children. on this view, the con-
ventional nuclear family—consisting of children residing with their
shared, biological, opposite-sex married parents—should be upheld, in
law and custom, as the ideal model to which most people should aspire.
the pluralist camp, in contrast, is committed to a wider diversity of
family types. Individuals should be free to construct families as they see
fit, and established structures should be neither idealized nor favored. In
the words of a leading proponent of pluralism, Judith Stacey, there are
“few limits on the kinds of marriage and kinship patterns people might
wish to devise.”2 For pluralists, “[t]he meaning and quality of intimate
bonds” are far more important than “their customary forms.” on this
approach, marriage is just one option among many—one setting in which
* Robert mundheim Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania Law School. I wish to
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1. See Amy L. Wax, Traditionalism, Pluralism, and Same-Sex Marriage, 59 RUtgeRS L.
Rev. 377 (2007).
2. See JUdIth StAcey, In the nAme oF the FAmILy 127 (1996).
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citizens can choose to establish relationships, bear children, and live their
lives. Pluralists see no reason to preserve marriage as conventionally
defined. many see no problem in dispensing with marriage altogether.
A powerful assumption within this camp is that happiness, welfare, and
wide-ranging freedom of choice can coexist in the realm of family life. on
this view, established family forms are no better than others and there is
nothing intrinsic to particular kinds of families that is more conducive to
the well-being of adults and children. In the right circumstances, a variety
of family types can function equally well. the effort to foster a broader
range of possibilities has been directed, in particular, at expanding options
for personal relationships between men and women beyond the form that
has traditionally been identified as the most desirable for such relation-
ships—which is marriage. this effort has been identified with what david
Blankenhorn, in his recent book The Future of Marriage,3 terms deinstitu-
tionalization—the effort to demote marriage from its place as the central
paradigm for male-female relations and for raising children.4
Is this pluralist vision a blueprint for the future? In fact, that future has
already arrived. A grand experiment in living is now underway in our
society and the deinstitutionalization of marriage is proceeding apace.
however, not all sectors of society have participated equally in the exper-
iment. Among some groups, conventional marriage and the traditional
nuclear family are as strong as ever. In others, they have declined or
virtually disappeared.
A picture has now emerged of a growing divergence in family life by
social class, income, education, and race. Professional demographers have
known about these trends for some time, and awareness has increased
among social scientists generally. Sara mcLanahan, as president of the
Population Association of America, called attention to these develop-
ments in a landmark article in demography in 2004.5 much work in the
social sciences literature is now addressed to documenting these patterns,
with efforts directed at understanding the causes as well as exploring the
3. dAvId BLAnkenhoRn, the FUtURe oF mARRIAge (2007).
4. For a classic statement of the pluralist, or diversity, model of the family see the
AmeRIcAn LAW InStItUte’S PRIncIPLeS oF the LAW oF FAmILy dISSoLUtIon: AnALySIS And
RecommendAtIonS (2002). For critiques of family pluralism, see the following examples: JAne
LeWIS, the end oF mARRIAge? IndIvIdUALISm And IntImAte ReLAtIonS (2003); RoBIn
FRetWeLL WILSon, Re-conceIvIng the FAmILy: cRItIQUe on the AmeRIcAn LAW InStItUte’S
PRIncIPLeS oF the LAW oF FAmILy dISSoLUtIon (2006). For a review of different conceptions
of the family, see Amy L. Wax, The Conservative’s Dilemma: Traditional Institutions, Social
Change, and Same-Sex Marriage, 42 SAn dIego L. Rev. 1059 (2005).
5. Sara S. mcLanahan, Diverging Destinies: How Children Are Faring Under the Second
Demographic Transition, 41 demogRAPhy 607, 607 (2004). See also, Sara S. mcLanahan &
Lynn casper, Growing Diversity and Inequality in the American Family, in 2 StAte oF the
UnIon: AmeRIcA In the 1990S, 1, 7 (Reynolds Farley ed., 1995).
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implications of emerging family structure disparities along lines of class
and race.6 Legal scholars, in contrast, have paid relatively little attention
to these developments, and few have probed the implications for family
law and policy.7
the segmentation of family forms by class and race is the product of
three interrelated trends. the first is a differential shift in the patterns of
marriage, including its timing and prevalence. the second concerns the
incidence of divorce and remarriage. the third bears on patterns of child-
bearing and child rearing, which determine whether children are born
within marriage or outside it, and are raised by both their biological par-
ents, by a single parent, or by some other combination of adults.
the changes in behavior related to marriage and procreation converge
to produce a complex landscape. the selective weakening of customary
forms and practices has generated new permutations, with the rise of novel
combinations and relationships. the number of single-parent families,
whether formed through divorce or extramarital childbearing, has
increased sharply and is on the rise. many more children are now growing
up in fatherless homes. Blended families—that is, families in which only
one adult in the home is biologically related to the child—are also more
commonplace. Likewise, there has been a surge in multipartnered fertility,
by which individuals produce children—either inside or outside of mar-
riage —with more than one partner.
these patterns now vary dramatically by sociodemographic status, and
the differences are growing. despite misconceptions to the contrary,
affluent and well-educated whites—society’s most privileged group—still
marry at very high rates and bear children predominantly within mar-
riage. Although the incidence of divorce increased across the board start-
ing in the 1960s, marriages among the affluent and educated have always
been more stable, and divorce has dramatically declined among this group
recently. Family “diversity”—and disarray—are now most common
among minorities. the traditional family is also declining among less edu-
cated whites, including those without a college degree. As summarized
recently in a review of family demographics by two economists, “the fam-
6. See, e.g., Lynn White & Stacy J. Rogers, Economic Circumstances and Family
Outcomes: A Review of the 1990s, 62 J. mARRIAge & FAm. 1035, 1040 (2000); david t.
ellwood & christopher Jencks, The Spread of Single Parent Families in the United States Since
1960, in the FUtURe oF the FAmILy, 25–65 (daniel P. moynihan, timothy m. Smeeding & Lee
Rainwater eds., 2004); Shelly Lundberg & Robert Pollak, The American Family and Family
Economics, 21 J. econ. PeRSPectIveS 3 (2007).
7. one notable exception is marsha garrison. See marsha garrison, Reviving Marriage:
Should We? Could We? 1, 6 (Brooklyn Law School Legal Studies Research Papers Working
Paper Series, Research Paper no. 43 2005).
. mcLanahan, supra note 5; Lundberg & Pollak, supra note 6.
570 Family Law Quarterly, Volume 41, Number 3, Fall 2007
ily trajectories of college graduates have deviated little from the family
trajectories of midcentury: almost all children are born within legal mar-
riages, and these marriages are relatively stable. nonmarital fertility and
multipartnered fertility is concentrated among women in the bottom third
of the income/education distribution, and the marriages that do take place
are relatively early and relatively unstable.”9
this essay addresses the class and race dimensions of this new family
diversity. In attempting to understand the emerging trends and investigate
their implications, it poses these questions: What is the current distribu-
tion of family structure, including patterns of marriage, divorce, child-
bearing, and child rearing? Specifically, what is the prevalence of the tra-
ditional nuclear family as opposed to alternative forms, such as single par-
ent and fatherless families, across different sociodemographic groups?
Second, why should we care about the distribution of family structure?
more specifically, how and to what extent might these trends contribute to
racial and economic inequality within American society today? What are
the possible explanations for the emergence of these patterns? Finally,
what, if anything, should and can be done about them?
II. Marriage
marriage has long been the foundation for family and child rearing in
the United States. Until recently, in all social classes, “[f]amilies headed
by a couple in their first marriage. . . have [ ] been the dominant family
form.”10 For example, “more than [ninety] percent of the women in every
birth cohort on record (records extend back to the mid-100s) have even-
tually married.”11 nonetheless, new patterns—called by some demogra-
phers the “second transition”—began to emerge “around 1960.”12 one
important element of this transition was a change in marital behavior. Age
of marriage began to climb for both men and women, and there was a slow
but steady decrease in the number of people entering into marriage in all
sociodemographic groups.
these overall patterns, however, mask profound differences by race
and class—differences that have intensified recently. the relationship of
marriage to class has shifted over time. For example, “[h]alf a century
ago, Americans, whether poor or well-to-do, all married at roughly the
9. Lundberg & Pollak, supra note 6, at .
10. AndReW J. cheRLIn, mARRIAge, dIvoRce, RemARRIAge 70 (rev. ed. 1992) (193).
11. Id. at 10. In addition, “[t]hroughout the twentieth century, about nine out of ten
Americans eventually married, although in some eras people tended to marry earlier than in oth-
ers. those who married earliest were the men and women who were born in the depression and
the war years.” Id. at 9.
12. mcLanahan, supra note 5.
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same rate.”13 this uniformity, with some minor variations, continued
through this century and into the post-World-War-II period. By the mid-
190s, however, marriage rates began to diverge, with poor women only
about three-quarters as likely to marry as more privileged women by the
end of that decade. the decline in marriage among the disadvantaged has
continued, with poor men and women in 2005 “only about half as likely
to be married as those with incomes at three or more times the poverty
level.”14
the precipitous decline in marriage among those with less education
and income contrasts with a stabilization, followed by an increase, in mar-
riage rates for women with more education. Although, for many decades,
women with a college degree were somewhat less likely to marry than
those with only a high-school education or some college, women with a
bachelor’s or graduate degree surpassed all other groups in the 1990s and
are now more likely to marry than those with less education.15 economic
status and education have long correlated with marriage rates for men,
with higher-earning and better-educated men more likely to marry. As
with women, class differences for men have also widened since the early
190s, with affluent, well-educated men (those with a college degree or
more) marrying at steadily higher rates than men with less education and
lower income.16
marital patterns have also diverged by race, with long-standing differ-
ences becoming more pronounced recently despite the decline in marriage
among all groups. Because the well-being of blacks is of great national
concern, black family structure has always received attention. the accel-
eration of family fragmentation has caused that attention to intensify.
over the past fifty years, marriage rates have declined precipitously
among blacks, with the percentage of adults married, or ever married, now
by far the lowest among major American groups.17 For example, sixty
percent of black women twenty-five to twenty-nine years old were
13. kathryn edin & Joanna m. Reed, Why Don’t They Just Get Married? Barriers to
Marriage Among the Disadvantaged in 15 the FUtURe oF chILdRen 117, 11 (Fall 2005).
14. Id.
15. garrison, supra note 7; see also Lundberg & Pollak, supra note 6, at 10–11;
mcLanahan, Diverging Destinies, supra note 5, at 612; diane k. mcLaughlin & daniel t.
Lichter, Poverty and the Marital Behavior of Young Women, 59 J. mARRIAge & FAm. 52, 591
(1997) (“completing high school and completing college increased the probability of marriage
by 1.5 and 1.7 times, respectively, compared with women who had not completed high
school.”). Id. at 59 (“[P]oor women were about 72% as likely to marry in a given year as
women who were not poor.”).
16. See Lundberg & Pollak, supra note 6, at 10–11; White & Rogers, supra note 6, at 1041;
timothy J. nelson, Low-Income Fathers, 30 Ann. Rev. Soc. 427, 436 (2004).
17. Joy Jones, Marriage Is for White People, WASh. PoSt, mar. 26, 2006, at B1:
the marriage rate for African Americans has been dropping since the 1960s, and today [African
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married in 1960, but only thirty-two percent in the mid-190s. In contrast,
the percentage of white women of the same age who were married went
from 3% to 62% during this period. Similar trends have also been
observed among black men, with this population achieving markedly
lower rates of marriage than men in other major American groups.1 these
disparities are observed even among men with similar levels of education
and income.19
III. Divorce
class and race have become more strongly correlated not just with the
incidence of marriage but also with its persistence. In short, class now pre-
dicts marital stability, with more educated persons enjoying longer-lasting
relationships.
the correlation between high levels of education and marital longevity
has not always been so strong. the incidence of divorce increased gener-
ally after World War II, with women at all levels of education ending their
marriages in the 1960s and 1970s at about the same rate.20 Beginning
around 190, however, the incidence of divorce began to diverge. the
divorce rate for women without an undergraduate college degree has
remained about the same, which is about thirty-five percent. “But for col-
lege graduates, the divorce rate in the first [ten] years of marriage has
plummeted to just over 16[%] of those married between 1990 and 1994
from 27[%] of those married between 1975 and 1979.”21 divorce risk has
Americans] have the lowest marriage rate of any racial group in the United States. In 2001, accord-
ing to the U.S. census, 43.3 percent of black men and 41.9 percent of black women in America had
never been married, in contrast to 27.4 percent and 20.7 percent respectively for whites.
See also R. kelly Raley, Recent Trends and Differentials in Marriage and Cohabitation: The
United States, in the tIeS thAt BInd: PeRSPectIveS on mARRIAge And cohABItAtIon,19, 23
(Linda J. Waite et al. eds., 2000) (“Since the 1950s, black women’s marriage rates have
declined much more steeply than white women’s.”); Robert d. mare & christopher Winship,
Socioeconomic Change and the Decline of Marriage for Blacks and Whites, in the URBAn
UndeRcLASS 175, 175 (christopher Jencks & Paul e. Peterson eds., 1991); david t. ellwood
& Jonathan crane, Family Change Among Black Americans: What Do We Know?, 4 J. econ.
PeRSPectIveS 65, 6–69 (1990).
1. See Jones, supra note 17, at B1.
19. ellwood & crane, supra note 17.
20. dan hurley, Divorce Rate: It’s Not as High As You Think, n.y. tImeS, Apr. 19, 2005,
at F7:
As overall divorce rates shot up from the early 1960’s through the late 1970’s, . . . the divorce rate
for women with college degrees and those without moved lockstep, with graduates consistently hav-
ing about one-third to one-fourth the divorce rate of nongraduates.
ellwood & Jencks, supra note 6, at 13 (“. . .the percentage of previously married mothers who
were divorced also rose for every education group between the early 1960s and the early
190s.”).
21. See hurley, supra note 20 (summarizing data from various researchers in the field).
hurley also notes that, because most divorces occur within the first ten years of marriage, “the
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become more sensitive to men’s education level as well, with more years
of schooling now significantly reducing the odds of divorce.22 Although
better-educated men and women tend to marry later, their reduced divorce
risk is only partly explained by the positive association between later mar-
riage and marital stability. 23
Just as with other demographic trends in marriage and the family over
the last fifty years, divorce rates have diverged by race and ethnicity.
Blacks have always divorced more often than whites, but blacks have seen
a steeper increase since the mid-190s.24 As demographers megan
Sweeney and Julie Philips observe, “ . . . divorce rates for white women
continued to increase during the late 1970s, reaching a peak in 1969, and
then stabilized (and even declined somewhat) during the 190s.”25 In con-
trast, “[b]eginning in the mid to late 190s . . . crude divorce rates for
blacks appear to drift upward . . . Indeed the smoothed divorce rate among
white women was 9% lower than that of black women in 190, but by
1993, this difference had expanded to 29%.”26 Although the decline in
black marriage rates in recent decades would be expected to decrease the
risk of divorce as the population entering into marriage became more
selective, in fact the trend has been in the opposite direction. Large dif-
ferences in the divorce rates of blacks and whites have persisted through
the 1990s and into this decade.27
divorce rate for college graduates who married between 1990 and 1994 would end up at only
about 25 percent, compared to well over 50 percent for those without a four-year college
degree.” For a summary of statistics on divorce and social class, see especially Steven P. martin,
Trends in Marital Dissolution by Women’s Education in the United States, 15 demogRAPhIc
ReSeARch 537–60 (2006). In summarizing martin’s findings, Sarah mcLanahan explains that
[I]n his examination of divorce rates for marriage cohorts of college-educated and non-college-edu-
cated women, [Steve] martin found that divorce rates increased for both groups (although slightly
more for less-well-educated women) from the early 1960s through the late 1970s. After 190, how-
ever, the trends diverged, with divorce rates falling among college-educated women and continuing
to rise among less well-educated women.
mcLanahan, Diverging Destinies, supra note 5, at 612.
22. White & Rogers, supra note 6, at 1043.
23. See martin, supra note 21 (noting a significant socio-educational disparity in divorce
even when controlling for age of marriage).
24. megan m. Sweeney & Julie A. Phillips, Understanding Racial Differences in Marital
Disruption: Recent Trends and Explanations, 66 J. mARRIAge & FAm. 639, 643 (2004).
25. Id.
26. Id. (noting that “[o]ur results suggest that the increases in rates of marital disruption
since the mid-1970s have been steeper among blacks than among Whites. Although the disrup-
tion rate appeared to level off for Whites in the post-190 period, it began to rise for blacks
beginning in the mid-190s.”).
27. See ellwood & Jencks, supra note 6, at 42.
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IV. Childbearing
In the past fifty years, more frequent decoupling of marriage and child-
bearing has marked women’s reproductive behavior. Since the mid-1970s
(when fertility in the United States reached an all-time low), birth rates—
as measured by the number of children born to woman of childbearing
age—have modestly increased overall. At the same time, however, the
number of children born to unmarried mothers has soared. “collectively,
these trends yield a particularly striking increase in the ratio of unmarried
births to total births”2 In the early 1950s, “only about 4% of children were
born outside marriage”29 and many of the mothers married immediately
following these births.30 In contrast, more than one third of all births were
to unmarried mothers by the end of the twentieth century, with the most
recent data putting the figure at 36%.31 Although extramarital childbearing
increased in all classes,32 the incidence diverged widely by mother’s edu-
cation and economic status, with the proportion of children born outside of
marriage significantly greater for mothers with less education and lower
family income. the most important behavioral divide that has emerged is
between women with a college degree or more, and everyone else. As
ellwood and Jencks note, the significant increase in extramarital child-
bearing “is not confined to the least educated. Quite the contrary. the
increase has been about as steep among women with twelve to fifteen years
of school as among those with less. only college graduates seem largely
2. Joanna gray et al., The Rising Share of Nonmarital Births: Fertility Choice or Marriage
Behavior? 43 demogRAPhy 241, 241 (2006). Likewise, although teen pregnancy and childbirth
rates (births per 1,000 adolescent females) have dropped in the past fifteen years, those trends
reflect declining fertility rates generally. In contrast with the situation at midcentury, however,
most births to women under age 20 take place outside marriage. the extramarital birthrate has
continued its steady rise among all women of childbearing age. See Positive Trends Recorded
in U.S. Data on Teenagers, n.y. tImeS, July 13, 2007.
29. Andrew J. cherlin, The Deinstitutionalization of Marriage, 66 J. mARRIAge & FAm.
4, 52 (2004).
30. See david t. ellwood & christopher Jencks, The Uneven Spread of Single-Parent
Families: What Do We Know? Where Do We Look for Answers? in SocIAL IneQUALIty 3-77
(kathryn m. neckerman ed.; ellwood & Jencks, supra note 6, at 24–65.
31. mcLanahan, Diverging Destinies, supra note 5, at 611. See also Leah Ward Sears, A
Case for Strengthening Marriage, WASh. PoSt, oct. 30, 2006, A17 (citing center for disease
control and Prevention data showing that “almost 36[%] of all births are [now] the result of
unmarried childbearing, the highest percentage ever recorded.”).
32. mAggIe gALLAgheR, the ABoLItIon oF mARRIAge: hoW We deStRoy LAStIng Love
5 (1996). gallagher states that “[b]etween 192 and 1992 the proportion of single women with
some college education who bore out-of-wedlock children more than doubled, from 5.5 to
11.3[%].” By way of contrast she notes that, despite their low rates of extramarital childbear-
ing relative to other sociodemographic groups, “college-educated women today are more like-
ly to become unwed mothers than women as a whole were in 1960. they are even more likely
to approve of other women doing so.”
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exempt.”33 As a consequence of this “exemption,” the percentage of chil-
dren born to the most educated segment of the female population (those
with a four-year college degree or postgraduate education) has remained in
the single digits, the lowest the incidence for white women in this group.
In contrast, for women with a high-school degree or less, out-of-wedlock
birth rates have soared and now exceed 40%.34
Although extramarital childbearing among blacks also varies by educa-
tion and income, births outside marriage are far more common among
black than white women at all levels of education and income. Because
white, female college graduates so rarely have children outside of mar-
riage, the disparity is particularly striking for well-educated black women,
with the percentage of black, female college graduates giving birth out of
wedlock almost 20% higher than for non-hispanic caucasian women of
the same educational class.35 Although extramarital childbearing rates for
blacks at all socioeconomic levels exceed that for other racial groups, the
rate of increase in extramarital births is now greatest among hispanic
women. At the current juncture, “[f]orty-five percent of all hispanic births
occur outside of marriage, compared with 24 percent for whites and 15 per-
cent for Asians. only the percentage for blacks—6 percent—is higher.”36
Finally, demographers have documented a rise in so-called multipart-
nered fertility—that is, the pattern of men fathering children (often extra-
maritally) by more than one woman, with a corresponding increase in
women bearing children outside of marriage by more than one man.37
once again, the evidence suggests significant variation by race and social
class, with multipartnered fertility far more common among persons with
less education and income, and also more prevalent among blacks.3
33. ellwood & Jencks, supra note 6, at 10.
34. See mcLanahan, Diverging Destinies, supra note 5, at 612; White & Rogers, supra note
6, at 1047; edin & Reed, supra note 13, at 11.
35. gALLAgheR, supra note 32, at 119 (noting that “[o]ver the past twenty years . . . the ille-
gitimacy rate among black female high school dropouts has roughly doubled. Among black
female college graduates, the illegitimacy rate has tripled.”).
36. heather macdonald, Surge in Birth Rate Among Unwed Hispanics Creating New U.S.
Underclass, dALLAS moRnIng neWS, Jan. 21, 2007 at 1.
37. See, e.g., cassandra Logan et al., Men Who Father Children with More Than One
Woman: A Contemporary Portrait of Multiple Partner Fertility, chILdtRendS PUBLIcAtIon
#2006-10, 2006. See also maria cancian & daniel R. meyer, The Economic Circumstances of
Fathers with Children on W-2, FocUS 22, 19, 21–23 (Sum. 2002).; the Fragile Families
Research Brief, June 2002, no. , available at http://crcw.princeton.edu/briefs/ research-
brief.pdf (Aug. , 2006).; Ronald B. mincy, Who Should Marry Whom?: Multiple Partner
Fertility Among New Parents, center for Research on child Wellbeing Working Paper #02-03-
FF, Feb. 2002, 1, 14 available at http://crcw.princeton.edu/workingpapers/WP02-03-FF-
mincy.pdf (accessed Aug. , 2006); karen B. guzzo & Frank F. Furstenberg, Jr., Multipart-
nered Fertility Among American Men, 44 demogRAPhy 53–601 (Aug. 2007).
3. See Logan, supra note 37 (finding that black men in her sample of low-income males
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V. Child rearing
What are the implications of these patterns of marriage, divorce, and
reproduction for the setting in which children grow up? overall, many
fewer children are being reared in traditional nuclear families, defined as
those consisting of two married parents and their shared biological chil-
dren. more children are growing up in single-parent households and in a
range of blended-family types—that is, those that include only one of the
child’s biological parents (usually the mother) and an adult (usually male)
biologically unrelated to the child. once again, the incidence of children
raised in traditional nuclear families, as compared to alternative-family
types, varies widely by social class. By 2002, nearly half of all children
with less educated mothers (those with four or fewer years of high school)
were living without their biological fathers,39 either with their single
mother, or with their mother and an unrelated male adult. many were also
residing with half-siblings or with children to whom they were biologi-
cally unrelated.
In contrast, fatherless or blended households are much less common for
women who have completed four years of college or more, and those
women are also more likely to be married to the father of their children.40
this means that children of well-educated mothers more often grow up
with a man present, and that man is usually the biological father. Indeed,
“virtually all—92%—of children whose parents make over $75,000 per
year are living with both [biological] parents.”41 Because marriage rates
are high within this group, the children’s parents tend to be married to
each other.
not surprisingly, there are also marked differences in children’s living
situation by race. Quite simply, fatherless households are the norm among
blacks and are common at all education levels within that group. As
harknett and mcLanahan observe, “[b]ecause African-Americans have
higher rates of nonmarital childbearing and divorce than the general pop-
ulation, African-American children spend substantially more time in sin-
were twice as likely as white men to have children by more than one woman). See also guzzo
& Furstenberg, supra note 37 (finding relatively high rates of multipartnered fertility for low
income and black men); Baby Fathers and American Family Formation: Low-Income, Never
Married Parents in Louisiana before Katrina, Ronald mincy and hillard Pouncy, eds., An
Essay in the FUtURe oF the BLAck FAmILy series, center for marriage and Families at the
Institute for American values (2007) (showing a high incidence of multi-partnered fertility in a
Louisiana sample of poor parents that is more than 0% black).
39. See, e.g., ellwood & Jencks, supra note 6, at 37. See also mcLanahan, Diverging
Destinies, supra note 5, at 612; ellwood & Jencks, supra note 30, at 14.
40. ellwood & Jencks, supra note 30, at 13–14.
41. kAy hymoWItZ, mARRIAge And cASte In AmeRIcA 22 (2006).
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gle-parent households than white or hispanic children.”42 Indeed, “black
children are eight times more likely than white children to live with an
unwed mother.”43 For black children under age six, “the most common
arrangement—applying to 42 percent. . . —was to live with a never-mar-
ried mother.”44 Another consequence of low marriage rates and high
divorce rates among blacks is that more black than white children live in
blended families. As a result, more black children are raised in households
with an unrelated adult male.
VI. Why Do We Care?
Why should class and race disparities in family structure and repro-
ductive behavior elicit concern? these patterns have important conse-
quences because family structure is linked to the well-being of both adults
and children. A growing body of research shows that children who grow
up with single or unmarried parents are less well off on many measures.
this is partly because single-parent families having fewer resources. Just
as marriage brings financial benefits to both parties, it also alleviates eco-
nomic hardship for children.45 not surprisingly, poverty rates for children
of never-married mothers are substantially higher than for children of
divorced mothers or from intact families.46 In recent decades, poverty has
increasingly become concentrated in the growing number of households
maintained by unmarried mothers.47 the poverty rates for individuals liv-
ing in married two-parent households is about seven percent, but
“[a]mong individuals in families with an unmarried head and children
present (five-sixths of whom are female unmarried heads), the poverty rate
[is] 40.3 percent.”4 the problem is especially acute for black children. A
42. kristen harknett & Sara S. mcLanahan, Racial and Ethnic Differences in Marriage
After the Birth of a Child, 69 Am. Soc. Rev. 790, 790 (2004).
43. gALLAgheR, supra note 32, at 117.
44. Id.
45. See, e.g., Robert I. Lerman, How Do Marriage, Cohabitation, and Single Parenthood
Affect the Material Hardships of Families with Children? 9–10 (Urban Institute and American
University, July 2002) (Lerman 2002a).
46. Zenchao Qian et al., Out-of-Wedlock Childbearing, Marital Prospects and Mate
Selection 4 Soc. FoRceS 473, 47 (2005).
47. cheRLIn, supra note 10, at 91. Indeed,
[t]he child born outside of marriage is thirty times more likely to live in persistent poverty than is
the child whose parents got married and stayed married. Sixty percent of children whose mothers
never married will be poor for most of their childhoods, compared to just 2 percent of children whose
parents got married and stay married.
gALLAgheR, supra note 32, at 32. Similarly, ellwood & crane state that
…even among single-parent families, those headed by never-married mothers (as opposed to women
who were previously married) are the most disadvantaged. never-married mothers have far longer
welfare stays than other women, even after controlling for race, education, and work experience.
ellwood & crane, supra note 17, at 70.
4. hilary hoynes et al, Poverty in America: Trends and Explanations, 20, J. econ.
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recent survey reveals that, regardless of race, nearly sixty percent of chil-
dren under age six in mother-headed families were in poverty.49 Indeed, it
has been estimated that the failure of the child poverty rate to decline
between 1967 and 2003, despite significant increases in female labor-force
participation, can be traced to the dramatic growth in extramarital births
and fatherless families.50 child support has not alleviated this situation, as
it is not always available, is difficult to collect, and is rarely sufficient to
make up for the father’s absence.51
Although its economic effects are not as severe as for extramarital
births, divorce also undermines the well-being of children. While women’s
standard of living often declines after a marriage dissolves, men’s usually
gains.52 Since most children live with their mothers after divorce, women’s
economic difficulties translate into more financial stress and fewer eco-
nomic resources available to others in the household. Finally, living with
married parents is advantageous not just because a father’s presence in the
home is an important hedge against poverty, but also because marriage
boosts men’s earnings.53 thus, children who live with their married bio-
logical parents will tend to have more resources available to finance their
upbringing.
economic deprivation is not the only negative consequence of living
with a single parent. noneconomic factors are also critical. children living
apart from their fathers enjoy less parental attention and personal invest-
ment in their upbringing. they suffer more disorder and uncertainty in
PeRSPectIveS, 47–6, at 49 (2006).
49. White & Rogers, supra note 6, at 1036. See also id. at 103:
the link between family structure and family income grew during the 1990s. . . . Until relatively
recently, the economic advantage of married-couple families stemmed from their having access to
male earnings, which were much higher than female earnings. during the 190s and continuing
through the 1990s, however, their advantage was increasingly due to the presence of two earners.
50. hoynes et al, supra note 4, at 49.
51. According to the most recent data, about 74% of nonresidential fathers do not pay child
support at all, and low-income fathers are particularly unlikely to pay. nelson, supra note 16,
at 439–40. See, e.g., cheRLIn, supra note 10.
52. See id at 73:
In the Panel Study of Income dynamics (PSId), a national study of families who were interviewed
annually beginning in 196, separated and divorced women suffered an average drop of about 30
percent in their standard of living in the year following a marital break-up. men, in contrast, experi-
enced a rise of 10 to 15[%] because they no longer fully supported their wives and children.
53. See Avner Ahituv & Robert I. Lerman, How Do Marital Status, Work Effort, and Wage
Rates Interact? 44 demogRAPhy 623–47 (2007) (analyzing data from a the national
Longitudinal Survey of youth, a large demographic sample, to conclude that “being married
and having high earnings reinforce each other over time”). See also Sanders korenman & david
neumark, Does Marriage Really Make Men More Productive, 26 J. hUmAn ReS. 22–307
(1990). As korenman and neumark show, married men’s higher average earnings is not just a
matter of a “selection” effect—that is, of the greater propensity of men with desirable attributes
and earning power to marry. Rather, marriage actually induces men to earn more.
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family life and relationships. the absence of consistent male guidance
is thought to contribute to the difficulties experienced by children from
single-mother homes.54
Both economic and noneconomic deprivations take their toll. Social
scientists have documented that children from nontraditional families
have an enhanced risk of problems with life-long repercussions.55
children growing up with one parent are significantly more likely to drop
out of school and have an out-of-wedlock child themselves.56 they also
have “lower educational attainment, poorer mental health, and more fam-
ily instability when they grow up.”57 Recent research reveals that children
raised in blended or stepparent families experience similar types of prob-
lems. In addition to having lower educational achievement and complet-
ing fewer years of schooling, these children experience relatively more
behavioral and psychological problems throughout life and have less sta-
ble adult relationships.5 Indeed, children from blended families fare no
better than children raised by single or divorced parents.59 Although, as
with single-parent families, this is partly due to blended families’ lower
average socioeconomic status, significant adverse effects are also
observed even when families are matched for available income and
parental education.
In sum, data from a variety of studies now strongly suggests that chil-
dren growing up in settings other than traditional families are at a disad-
vantage.60 Being raised by one’s married biological parents does indeed
appear to produce superior outcomes. thus, a picture has gradually
54. See kristin Anderson moore et al., Marriage from a Child’s Perspective: How Does
Family Structure Affect Children and What Can We Do About It?, child trends Research Brief
(June 2002).
55. Id.
56. ellwood & crane, supra note 17, at 70 (“this result reflects both an impact due to
reduced income and a separate component attributed to family structure itself.”).
57. mcLanahan, Diverging Destinies, supra note 5, at 611. there is also a documented rela-
tionship between family structure and employment, at least in young black men. See ellwood
& crane, supra note 17, at 70.
5. See moore et al., supra note 54; Wendy Sigle-Rushton & Sara mcLanahan, Father
Absence and Child Well-Being: A Critical Review, in the FUtURe oF the FAmILy, 116–55
(2004); ABIgAIL theRnStRom & StePhen theRnStRom, no eXcUSeS: cLoSIng the RAcIAL
gAP In LeARnIng, 132 (2003); mcLanahan, Diverging Destinies, supra note 5, at 627.
59. See discussion of blended families, infra. See also kAthRyn edIn & mARIA keFALAS,
PRomISeS I cAn keeP: Why PooR Women PUt motheRhood BeFoRe mARRIAge, 215 (2005)
(noting that “living apart from either biological parent at any point during childhood is what
seems to hurt children.” (emphasis in original)). See also donna k. ginther & Robert A. Pollak,
Family Structure and Children’s Educational Outcomes: Blended Families, Stylized Facts, and
Descriptive Regressions, 41 demogRAPhy 671, 696 (2004); Sandra hofferth, Residential
Father Family Type and Child Well-Being: Investment Versus Selection, 43 demogRAPhy 53,
77 (2006).
60. mcLanahan, Diverging Destinies, supra note 5, at 627.
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emerged from the social science literature of the traditional family as the
“gold standard”—the most desirable setting for raising children. A
research brief by Child Trends sums up the scholarly consensus:
[R]esearch clearly demonstrates that family structure matters for children, and
the family structure that helps them most is a family headed by two biological
parents in a low conflict marriage. children in single parent families, children
born to unmarried mothers, and children in step-families or cohabiting
relationships face higher risks of poor outcomes.61
the relative paucity of “gold standard” families among blacks and peo-
ple with less education and income has important implications for the
future distribution of resources and well-being in our society. economic
inequality in the United States has recently become more pronounced.
this trend has generated growing attention and concern, with economists
and others attempting to identify the causes and cures for accelerating
economic disparities.62 Such factors as globalization of capital and labor,
the decline of labor unions, growing returns to skill and education, and
higher costs for basics like housing, education, and health care, are all
thought to contribute to these patterns. In the myriad articles bemoaning
and exploring the potential causes of rising inequality, relatively little
stress is placed on family structure. yet that factor clearly contributes to
socioeconomic polarization and continues to grow in importance.
the family has remained strong for the most educated segment of the
population, especially among whites. Assortative mating—with individu-
als marrying others with similar levels of education and potential earning
power—further enhances the fortunes of the most privileged group. In
contrast, black families and those with less education infrequently reap
the benefits of two incomes. In addition, personal attention from parents
is thought by many developmental experts to be a potent source of human
capital.63 Sustained parental oversight and the consistent investment of
61. moore et al., supra note 54, at 6. See also Amy L. Wax, Traditionalism, Pluralism, and
Same-Sex Marriage, 59 RUtgeRS L. Rev. 377, 402–12. (2007).
62. See, e.g., Joel kotkin & david Friedman, Rebuilding the Middle Class, L.A. tImeS,
dec. 3, 2006, at m6; thomas Lemieux, Increasing Residual Wage Inequality: Composition
Effects, Noisy Data, or Rising Demand for Skill?, 96 Am. econ. Rev. 461 (2006); thomas
Piketty & emmanuel Saez, The Evolution of Top Incomes: A Historical and International
Perspective, (nat’l Bureau of econ. Research, Working Paper no. 11955, 2006); Arloc
Sherman & Aviva Aron-dine, New CBO Data Show Income Inequality Continues to Widen:
After-Tax-Income for Top 1 Percent Rose by $146,000 in 2004, center on Budget and Policy
Priorities, Jan. 23, 2007, http://www.cbpp.org/1-23-07inc.htm. See also Robert Frank, Falling
Behind: How Inequality Harms the Middle Class (2007) (documenting growing economic
inequality in the United States).
63. For controversy on the degree to which parenting matters, however, see Amy L. Wax,
Unique, Like Everyone Else, 13 PoL’y Rev. (Aug./Sept. 2006).
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parents’ time and effort are believed critical to the development of
productive citizens. If children with educated parents or from economi-
cally well-off groups more often grow up in families that perform these
functions well, existing inequalities will grow.
given current demographic realities, children from less-affluent
families will tend to receive less parental attention and private support.
given very high overall extramarital birth rates, the same is true for black
children at all levels of income. In particular, the absence of fathers
significantly reduces the amount of adult investment in children’s develop-
ment. Unmarried and divorced fathers usually do not reside with their
children. Fathers who live in separate households or are not married to their
children’s mother are less firmly attached to their offspring, with many
contributing to their children’s welfare only occasionally or intermittently.
A far larger number of poor, nonwhite, and less-educated fathers are absent
or unmarried, so their children are frequently shortchanged.
yet another way in which class divides in family structure and repro-
ductive patterns exert a potentially detrimental influence on children’s
upbringing is by selectively weakening neighborhoods and communities.
Residential segregation by race and class means that fatherless and single-
parent families will tend to cluster together geographically, with tradi-
tional two-parent families in relatively short supply. A paucity of respon-
sible, married fathers undermines the supervision and proper socialization
of children. the balance of married and unmarried men also has implica-
tions for the incidence of antisocial behavior. Single adult males create a
potentially disruptive presence because they are more likely to engage in
criminal activities or to be unemployed.64 crime and male idleness make
neighborhoods unsafe, put stress on family life, and undermine men’s
ability to contribute to their children’s upbringing, both personally and
financially. the benefits of a strong marriage culture thus “radiate outward
into the commonweal.”65
In sum, disparities in father absence between well-off children and the
less privileged have widened in recent decades and are growing. the gaps
in family structure between blacks and whites, especially among educat-
ed families, are also pronounced. class and race differences in family type
affect individual children and the wider community. these disparities
64. Robert W. Sampson, Stephen W. Roudenbush & Felton earls, Neighborhoods and
Violent Crime: A Multilevel Study of Collective Efficacy, 277 ScIence 91, 924 (Aug. 15, 1997);
John Laub & Robert Sampson, Shared Beginnings, Divergent Lives (2003); Robert Sampson et
al., Does Marriage Reduce Crime? A Counterfactual Approach to Within-Individual Causal
Effects, 44 cRImInoLogy 465 (2006).
65. Brad Wilcox, Marriage, the Poor, and the Commonweal, in the meAnIng oF mARRIAge,
244 (Robert george & Jean Bethke elshtain eds., 2006).
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systematically undermine attempts to create equal opportunity across
lines of class and race.66
VII. What Is to Be Done?
What should be done about these changes in the family? Should we
attempt to reverse these developments? Are we able to do so? If not, can
we compensate for detrimental effects and counter resulting inequalities
between groups?
how these questions are resolved depends on whether the growing
diversity of family structure and the resulting differentials by race and class
are seen as undesirable or as problems in need of solution. traditionalists
are clearly troubled by these trends. they point out that conventional fam-
ilies have intrinsic strengths. And many note that, although government
programs can try to ease the difficulties of nontraditional families, they can
never entirely eliminate the advantages that conventional nuclear families
enjoy nor close the gaps between different family types. Pluralists, in
contrast, are skeptical of efforts to restore longstanding family forms. they
deny that good or bad outcomes are intrinsic to any family type and believe
that observed differences can be eliminated by providing outside assistance
and resources or changing policies to make life easier for fragmented
families.
Assuming one would want to restore the traditional family, is that proj-
ect feasible? one way to approach this question is to investigate the causal
roots of observed patterns. Why has the family changed, and why have
these changes not been uniform by class and race? In particular, why do
people at different levels of education and income now behave so differ-
ently? Likewise, what is the source of the dramatic black–white disparity
in family structure, and why has it failed to yield to greater opportunities
and improved economic and social conditions for blacks? demographers
have long wrestled with these issues. the chief theories point to three
main sources of influence: economics, technology, and culture.
economic explanations look mainly to monetary factors and to the
incentives created by the availability of resources. traditional economic
models identify four principal influences on choices regarding marriage
and family: male earnings and employment, female earnings, the sex ratio
66. See Steven P. martin, Growing Evidence for a “Divorce Divide”?: Education and
Marital Dissolution Rates in the U.S. Since the 1970s, supra:
educational divergence in divorce rates might be considered a benign sort of inequality, in that the
advantaged group is doing better but the disadvantaged group is doing no worse. the divergence in
stable married families with children, however, is such that families with highly educated mothers
and families with less educated mothers are clearly moving in opposite directions, and the disad-
vantaged group is doing worse.
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of marriageable individuals, and the availability of public assistance.
economists have developed a number of basic assumptions about the role
of these factors. men with higher earnings are more likely to marry and
stay married because they are viewed as more desirable mates. Likewise,
women who work and have high earnings will be less eager to marry
because they have less need for male resources. Public assistance for
single-parent families will discourage marriage, especially if husbands’
earnings are low or higher income leads to a loss of benefits. A paucity of
marriageable men—through incarceration, premature death, low earnings,
or low employment—will lead to lower marriage rates, both because too
few men will be available or considered suitable husband material
and because more desirable men will have more opportunity to “play the
field.”67
the literature that discusses and analyzes the economic model is exten-
sive and complex. A consensus has developed that economic factors,
although perhaps exerting some influence, fail consistently to explain pat-
terns and trends in family structure.6 the notion that high male earnings
encourage marriage and high female earning potential and workforce par-
ticipation undermine it is based on a model of family economics that
views men’s and women’s roles as divergent and complementary.69
however, under current patterns of assortative mating, men and women
with equal earning power are more likely to marry each other. this is
more consistent with a model that stresses gains from mutuality, cooper-
ation, and consumption rather than a strict sexual division of labor. this
pattern also highlights the importance of noneconomic and cultural
factors, such as similarity in attitudes, values, outlook, and tastes.70
nevertheless, the benefits of these companionate marriages seem to be
going disproportionately to the upper classes, which are increasingly more
likely to marry and stay married than others. Why less-educated persons
do not seem as eager to join forces, despite the decline in sharp marital
division of labor, is not well understood.
the prevalence of marriage among the more educated and affluent is
sometimes attributed to the economic advantages women perceive from
marriage. Well-educated husbands are more desirable because they earn
more. only well-educated women have the ability and opportunity to snag
a prosperous husband. however because it slights other economic factors
that point in a different direction, this explanation grounded in female
67. See Lundberg & Pollak, supra note 6. See also harknett & mcLanahan, supra note 42,
at 792–93.
6. See, e.g., ellman & Jencks, supra note 6, at 47.
69. See gARy BeckeR, A tReAtISe on the FAmILy (191).
70. See Lundberg & Pollak, supra note 6.
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preference fails fully to account for upper-class women’s propensity for
marriage. educated men bring more economic resources to a marriage,
but, as elaborated more fully below, less-affluent women can still signifi-
cantly improve their standard of living by marrying men of their own
class, despite these men’s relatively modest earning power.71 thus, female
economic self-interest cannot explain the observed class divergence.
In addition, although there are advantages to marrying well, mother-
hood is often viewed as an important goal. Privileged women are still far
better equipped, economically and otherwise, to go the single-motherhood
route than their less-educated counterparts. yet unlike women with fewer
resources, high-status women still insist upon marriage before children. It
is unclear why upper-class women tend to forgo motherhood if unable to
find suitable mates. the key question is why they choose this outcome
when their poorer sisters do not.
Second, the focus on women’s preferences also does not explain why
well-educated men agree to marry their female counterparts. the answer
cannot be the desire to have children. Affluent men could adopt the pat-
terns more commonplace among those less well off, which is to have chil-
dren by women (and sometimes more than one) without marrying them.
If the goal is to reproduce at least cost, this strategy makes sense. given
the realities of weak child support enforcement and the demands of
domestic life, absentee fatherhood is far cheaper and entails less financial
sacrifice than taking the obligations of matrimony and married fatherhood
seriously. however, the financial costs are only part of the story. Resident
fathers devote far more personal time and attention to their children’s
upbringing.72 Why are educated and high-earning fathers more willing to
invest in their children in every way? economic theories seem unable to
explain why these men voluntarily agree to assume these considerable
burdens and why absentee fatherhood has failed to catch on among the
most educated segments of the population.
In the same vein, the notion that the marriage rates of unskilled men
have plummeted because their economic and employment situation has
seriously deteriorated is unpersuasive because it fails to comport with the
evidence. Although income differentials for men by education have
increased dramatically over time, this divergence has been driven primari-
ly by rising returns to college and graduate education. men with high
school degrees or less, and men at the bottom of the wage scale, have seen
71. See page 51–2 infra.
72. See mcLanahan, Diverging Destinies, supra note 5; Liana c. Sayer, Suzanne m.
Bianchi, & John P. Robinson, Are Parents Investing Less in Children? Trends in Mothers’ and
Fathers’ Time with Children, 110 Am. J. Soc. 1, 43 (2004) (showing that higher-income,
married fathers spend the most time with their children).
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their earnings stagnate or, in some cases, decrease slightly.73 nonetheless,
male high-school graduates and dropouts do not earn significantly less than
comparably educated men in past decades. the resources these men bring
into a marriage are therefore not dissimilar to what working-class men had
to offer decades ago, when marriage rates were far higher across the board
and family-structure differences by social class were far smaller. In sum,
the data on male earnings simply cannot explain the longitudinal changes
in marriage patterns and propensity by social and educational class over
time.74
the decrease in marriage among less educated persons is even more
puzzling because the evidence suggests that marriage still carries signifi-
cant economic advantages, even for persons of modest skills, earning
power, and economic prospects. these advantages hold, regardless of race,
and are more pronounced for blacks than whites.75 Studies indicate that
“adults who begin adulthood in poverty are sixty-six percent less likely to
remain poor if they get and stay married; that low-income married families
are less than half as likely to experience material hardship—missing a meal
or failing to pay bills—than are cohabiting or single parents; and that
single mothers who marry shortly after a nonmarital birth experience an
increase of more than fifty percent in their standard of living relative to
single parents and twenty percent relative to cohabiting families.”76
that well-functioning married couples can achieve greater economic
well-being, regardless of social class, stands to reason. marriage creates
efficiencies and economies of scale and opens up opportunities for
sustained cooperation in child rearing and other joint ventures that build
economic and social capital. In addition, as noted, there is evidence that
marriage causes men to work harder and earn more.77 Although higher-
earning men obviously bring more resources into marriage, even men
with modest earning power can contribute significantly to a household’s
economic position. Indeed, it can be argued that lower-income women
73. For statistics on trends in male earnings by education and class, see LAWRence mISheL,
JARed BeRnSteIn & SyLvIA ALLegRetto, the StAte oF WoRkIng AmeRIcA 2006/2007, 121,
151 (2007). See also edIn & keFALAS, supra note 59.
74. See, e.g., Robert g. Wood, Marriage Rates and Marriageable Men: A Test of the
Wilson Hypothesis, 30 J. hUmAn ReS. 163 (1995).
75. Robert Lerman, Effects of Marriage on Family Economic Well-Being (Urban Institute
and American University, July 2002); Lerman, supra note 45 (citing data indicating that “mar-
ried-couple households were much more likely to avoid poverty than all other types of house-
holds” and noting that “the highest advantage for married couples in reduced poverty was
among black households. Relative to poverty levels of married couple households, the percent-
age in poverty among black single parents was 20–40 percentage points higher; for whites, the
gap was only –20 percentage points.”).
76. Brad Wilcox, Marriage, the Poor, and the Commonwealth.
77. See discussion page 57 & note 53, supra.
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have a greater incentive to marry than women with more earning capaci-
ty. According to basic principles governing the marginal utility of money,
each additional dollar brought into a family has greater value at lower
rather than higher incomes.7 thus, a working husband’s earnings, even if
modest, can provide an important boost to purchasing power and can
significantly elevate the entire family’s standard of living. this effect is
especially important in its potential to lift the lowest earning families out
of poverty.
consider, for example, a single mother with two children earning $7.00
per hour—a sum not much above the current federal minimum wage of
$5.5. For full-time, year-round work (forty hours per week for fifty weeks
per year), her total yearly pretax income would be $14,000. Suppose she
marries a man with the same earning power. two workers at this wage
can together earn a pretax income of $2,000. that couple would also be
eligible for the earned Income tax credit, which would abate federal taxes
and improve their net earnings. Although that benefit would have some-
what lower value to the couple (due to their higher income) than to the
mother living alone with her children, it would still increase the pair’s total
effective earnings by several thousand dollars.79 more importantly, mar-
riage would elevate this family (including the two children) well above the
poverty line and significantly enhance the couple’s net financial position.
All told, marrying a person of equal earning capacity, regardless of
skill level, can be an effective way for men and women to raise their fam-
ily income and improve their standard of living. Although such a family
would be far from rich, its members would still be better off than if each
adult in the couple lived separately. Reaping those gains, however,
depends on hard work, consistent employment, active cooperation, and
the careful and sustained application of both spouse’s earnings to the
common enterprise. these are big “ifs:” there is no guarantee that the
potential for cooperation and harmonious sharing will be realized. If the
“downside” of marriage is sufficiently large for either spouse—in loss of
independence, increased domestic workload, abuse, conflict, or unhappi-
ness—then economic advantages will fail to hold sway. this balance of
costs and benefits is not solely a matter of economics because lack of mar-
ital cooperation is not properly regarded as an economic problem. Rather,
it is a matter of attitudes, values, commitment, socialization and behavior.
7. See ARthUR okUn, eQUALIty And eFFIcIency: the BIg tRAdeoFF (1975).
79. on the problem of the marriage penalty in some benefits programs, see the discussion
of poor relief programs and marginal tax rates, infra. on the current structure of the earned
Income tax credit, which illustrates the problem of the phase-out and the marriage penalty, see
Leslie Book, Preventing the Hybrid from Backfiring: Delivery of Benefits to the Working Poor
Through the Tax System, WIS. L. Rev. 1103,1110–11 (2006).
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the decline in marriage despite its potential to make people financially
and personally better off is a cultural problem, not an economic one.
In the same vein, poverty and socioeconomic factors do not fully
account for observed racial differences in family structure and marital
behavior. Falling marriage rates and increasing extramarital birth rates
among blacks are of special concern and have elicited a sustained effort to
understand these trends. despite a relative shortage of desirable black men,
especially among the best and least educated segments of the population,
demographers have concluded that racial differences in mate availability
and other factors (such as unemployment) that are thought to bear on mar-
ital eligibility explain but a small portion of the steep decline in marriage
among blacks over recent decades.0 Black men marry far less often than
men from other racial and ethnic groups with comparable education and
income. Significant numbers of employed black men now remain unmar-
ried, with marriage for African Americans declining even among the upper
classes.1 As one author explains, “African Americans are less likely (60%
as likely) to marry than whites, regardless of family culture, economic cir-
cumstances, attitudes, welfare receipt, and marriage market conditions.”2
In sum, the employment status, education level and income of black men
fail to explain their far lower marriage rates. Although blacks’ economic
situation plays some role, its contribution is modest at best. culture, not
economics, holds the key to the fragile state of the black family.3
Another explanation cited for demographic shifts in family structure is
the pattern of government benefits for the poor. In his famous 196 book
Losing Ground, charles murray argued that federal welfare payments
0. See White & Rogers, supra note 6, at 1041; Jessie m. tzeng and Robert d. mare, Labor
Market and Socioeconomic Effects on Marital Stability, 24 Soc. ScIence ReS. 329 (1995). See
also mare & Winship, supra note 17, at 174–202; daniel t. Lichter et al., Local Marriage
Markets and the Marital Behavior of Black and White Women, 96 Am. J. Soc. 43, 67 (1991);
daniel Lichter et al., Race and the Retreat from Marriage: A Shortage of Marriageable Men?,
57 Am. Soc. Rev. 71, 799 (1992); ellwood & crane, supra note 17, at 65; Robert Schoen &
James R. kluegel, The Widening Gap in Black and White Marriage Rates: The Impact of
Population Composition and Differential Marriage Propensities, 53 Am. Soc. Rev. 95 (19).
See also JUne cARBone, FRom PARtneRS to PARentS, 93–94 (2000).
1 See cheRLIn, supra note 10, at 105 (cherlin, 1992, also explains that “[o]ther evidence
shows that the deteriorating labor market position of poorly educated black men cannot be the
only reason why fewer blacks are marrying. during the 1960s and 1970s, marriage declined near-
ly as much among better-off blacks as among poor blacks.”). See also harknett & mcLanahan,
supra note 42, at 792-93 (“Although important, the poor employment prospects of low-skilled
African American men cannot entirely explain racial differences in marriage because African
Americans are less likely to marry than whites at all socioeconomic levels .”).
2. mcLaughlin & Lichter, supra note 15, at 59.
3. See discussion of male attitudes and socialization, 59–93 infra. For more on this point
in the context of race, see Amy L. Wax, Race, Wrongs, and Remedies: Group Justice in the 21st
Century (forthcoming 200, hoover Institution Publications).
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under the Aid to Families with dependent children program were instru-
mental in discouraging marriage and encouraging out-of-wedlock child-
bearing among low-income women.4 Repeated efforts have been made to
evaluate this claim in intervening years with equivocal results.5
nonetheless, federal welfare reform legislation in 1996 was motivated in
large part to eliminate the perverse incentives generated by the prior
regime.6 It was believed that time limits and stricter work requirements,
which conditioned benefits on participation in work-related activities,
would encourage mothers to marry or discourage out-of-wedlock child-
bearing altogether. these hopes have not been realized, in part because
work support programs still effectively subsidize all types of families,
thus providing little added incentive to marry.7 In addition, the problem
of the decline in marriage and the increase in extramarital childbearing
has grown beyond the welfare population. these patterns now dominate
among working-class women with too much income to qualify for sub-
stantial cash welfare benefits under either the old or the new rules.
nonetheless, the current system of poor relief continues to provide
cause for concern. most programs are no longer designed to substitute for
work but rather to support or supplement earnings for low-income work-
ing households. these include the earned Income tax credit, food
stamps, medicaid, state-sponsored health insurance for poor children,
housing assistance, child support enforcement, and child care benefits.
most of these programs are means tested. As daniel Shaviro and others
have noted, a family may lose some or all government assistance as their
earnings increase—a result that operates like a tax on additional resources
coming into the family. Indeed, the combined effect of these programs has
the potential to impose very high, effective marginal tax rates on addi-
tional income, whatever its source.
4. chARLeS mURRAy, LoSIng gRoUnd (194).
5. Robert moffitt, The Effect of Welfare on Marriage and Fertility, in WeLFARe, the
FAmILy, And RePRodUctIve BehAvIoR (Robert moffitt ed., 199).
6. See preamble to the Personal Responsibility and Work opportunity Reconciliation Act
of 1996, 42 U.S.c. § 601 (2000) (reauthorized by the deficit Reduction Act of 2005, Pub. L. no.
109-171, Feb. , 2006, 120, Stat. 4).
7. See Amy L. Wax, Welfare Reform Isn’t Working, L.A. tImeS, oct. 22, 2006; Amy L.
Wax, Too Few Good Men, 134 PoL’y Rev. (dec. 2005/Jan. 2006).
. See daniel Shaviro, Welfare, Cash Grants, and Marginal Rates, new york University
Law & economics Working Papers, 2006. See also mickey hepner & W. Robert Reed,
The Effect of Welfare on Work and Marriage: A View from the States, 24 cAto J. 349, 365–70
(Fall 2005) (showing high marginal tax rates on work effort and marriage from the combination
of supplemental programs); Stephen d. holt, Making Work Really Pay: Income Support &
Marginal Effective Tax Rates Among Low-Income Working Households, presented to the
American tax Policy Institute (mar. 2005) (noting that available government programs in com-
bination have the potential to produce high, effective marginal rates for eligible families in
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one way in which single-mother families can “earn” additional money
is through marriage. A husband’s wages can boost family income. But
these wages also add to the family’s resources, which can disqualify the
family for food stamps and medicaid, or lead to the phasing out of the
refundable earned Income tax credit. Although the evidence suggests
that most eligible families do not take advantage of all available pro-
grams—and thus do not experience as high effective marginal tax rates on
additional earnings as they could9—the potential for existing government
programs to discourage marriage or work effort among low-income men
and women cannot be wholly discounted. Whether people are actually
aware of these consequences and are moved by them is an empirical ques-
tion. the effect of government policies in the wake of welfare reform
awaits further evaluation. In the current climate, however, marginal tax
effects of government benefits are not believed to be the principal factor
driving disparities in family structure.
In sum, the current consensus among demographers who study family
decline is that economic factors provide, at best, a partial explanation for
the recent disintegration of the family among less-educated and less-priv-
ileged persons or for its relative preservation among more well-off popu-
lations. despite the absence of external obstacles to forming stable fami-
lies and the documented economic and social advantages of married life,
men and women with less education now often reject marriage.
In an attempt to better understand the shift in reproductive behavior
among the least advantaged members of society, two social scientists,
kathryn edin and maria kefalas, conducted an ethnographic study of 162
single mothers in eight Philadelphia-area low-income neighborhoods.90
through extensive interviews and observations, the authors concluded
that most of their subjects had a positive—even idealized—view of
marriage. yet despite expressing a strong desire to marry and regarding
extra-marital childbearing as “second best,” almost all the mothers in the
sample remained single. the authors offer this explanation: expectations
for marriage have risen across the board. everyone now regards marriage
as a luxury good rather than as a necessity, so they refuse to tie the knot
unless they have first achieved economic success. A house, a well-paying
job, and enough money for a nice wedding are now needed before con-
sidering a trip to the altar. But few of the unskilled can make good on
these aspirations because wages at the bottom have stagnated or declined.
Wisconsin, but showing that incomplete utilization of existing programs yields much lower rates
in practice).
9. See holt, supra note .
90. edIn & keFALAS, supra note 59.
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the authors acknowledge that overall economic prospects for men with
a high-school education or less are not significantly worse than in past
decades when marriage rates were much higher. According to them, it is
not that most unskilled men are less able to support a family than they
were decades ago; earnings for this group have always been modest.
Rather, the problem is that women—and men—expect far more. In con-
trast, they conclude that having children does not carry similarly inflated
expectations. childbearing is a fundamental hallmark of female adulthood
that is central to poor women’s dignity and identity. Affluence and secu-
rity are not regarded as prerequisites for taking on this responsibility.
Although the idea that the class divergence in family structure can be
traced to well-off people’s superior ability to meet widely shared eco-
nomic expectations for marriage seems to make sense, the actual inter-
views edin and kefalas conducted do not support this theory. the women
in their study almost never complain about their men’s earning power.
Rather, the book is replete with evidence that men’s antisocial behavior,
not unfulfilled economic expectations, is the main obstacle to matrimony.
to be sure, these women’s accusations have an economic aspect: they
accuse the men of being unwilling to grasp opportunities, work steadily,
and spend wisely. they find fault with the men’s financial profligacy,
defiant attitudes, and lack of work discipline. And they claim that what
money the men manage to earn is seldom applied to family needs, but is
too often dissipated on personal luxuries, indulgences, and vice. the com-
plaints are not focused on low earning potential as such. Rather, they are
directed at how well and hard their men work, how they use their money,
and their lack of devotion to family life.
these women’s most vociferous complaints are reserved for men’s
chronic criminal behavior, drug use, violence, and, above all, repeated and
flagrant sexual infidelity. most of the men described in this book made no
effort to hide their frequent liaisons, which were often carried on simulta-
neously. more often than not, those relationships produced babies. these
men’s sexual habits—and women’s complicity in them—produced
conflict, jealousy, resentment, mistrust and tumultuous personal lives. the
connection between these patterns and economic factors is tenuous as best.
these tales do not point to rising expectations, economic or otherwise.
these women do not hold their men to new and higher standards. Rather,
they ask for the basics of responsible male behavior. Women have always
expected this from their husbands, but upper-middle-class women now
seem to get it far more often. Admittedly, the women in edin’s and
kefalas’s sample contribute to the very behaviors to which they object.
they are the ones bearing these men’s children outside of wedlock. to
many of them this seems better than marrying a man who is financially,
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personally, and sexually unreliable.
Although edin and kefalas focus on a small group of subjects and do
not purport to offer a comprehensive or systematic survey of low-income
women generally, their book is suggestive of the problems that afflict this
group. the overall impression gleaned from their account is that the men
these low-income women would potentially marry are not well socialized
to the expectations that conventionally apply to responsible husbands and
fathers. By implication, better-educated men may more consistently fulfill
these requirements. the possibility that the effective socialization of men
has declined selectively—or that the differential disintegration of the fam-
ily may reflect widening disparities in patterns of male behavior by race
and class—has received little serious attention. yet there is some indirect
evidence for this.
the detrimental effects of being raised in a single-parent home are
greater for boys than girls. Boys raised without fathers are more likely
than those from traditional families to become delinquent and commit
crimes.91 these patterns suggest that single-parent families are, on aver-
age, less effective in regulating male behavior. this inferior ability to
socialize boys could spill over into areas, such as sexual behavior and
relations with the opposite sex that require men to exercise restraint, to
cooperate with others, and to show responsibility. Unfaithfulness, incon-
stancy, unreliability, and the refusal to adhere to norms of monogamy are
particularly disruptive to harmonious male–female relationships and are
known to deter or destabilize marriage. these behaviors are hallmarks of
poor socialization.
nonetheless, race and class differences in these patterns have not been
systematically documented. A sustained study of such patterns would be
controversial and would pose methodological difficulties. there is a liter-
ature on the sexual mores of inner city blacks that suggests some reluc-
tance to adhere to norms of sexual fidelity,92 but rigorous comparisons
91. See Sampson, Roudenbush & earls, supra note 64, at 91–24; Laub & Sampson, supra
note 64; Sampson et al., supra note 64, at 465. It has also been suggested that the decline in male
college attendance—which has been especially pronounced among those with lower income—
might also be traceable to the rise in single-parent families and the lesser ability of those fami-
lies to inculcate the noncognitive habits and dispositions that make for educational success. See
Brian A. Jacob, Where the Boys Aren’t: Non-Cognitive Skills, Returns to School and the Gender
Gap in Higher Education, nBeR Working Paper 964, at 4 (2002) (finding that boys, but not
girls, growing up in single-parent households suffer a statistically significant reduction in their
likelihood of attending college and also that the difference in noncognitive skills between boys
and girls accounts for 40% of the sex gap in college enrollment).
92. See generally eLLIott LIeBoW, tALLey’S coRneR: A StUdy oF negRo StReet coRneR
men (2nd ed. 2003); see, e.g., nathan e. Fosse, Sex, Self-Worth, and the Inner-city: Procreation
and “Boundary Work” Among the truly disadvantaged, unpublished dissertation, harvard
University Sociology department, on file with author. See also christopher R. Browning & Lori
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with underprivileged individuals from other racial groups or in other
cultural settings have not yet been made. Social class differences are even
less well-studied. In 1970, edward Banfield, one of the first social scien-
tists to flesh out the notion of a “culture of poverty,” suggested that eco-
nomic failure is traceable to a particular cluster of attitudes, dispositions,
and understandings. According to Banfield, a reluctance to defer gratifi-
cation, to anticipate consequences, and to plan for the future, characterize
many individuals who fall into poverty. however, even if these observa-
tions are valid, surprisingly little is known about whether and how such
attitudinal factors translate into conduct relating to sexual behavior or
marital success. As with racial differences, class disparities in these
aspects of behavior are elusive and difficult to investigate, and there is
resistance to the notion that people from one race or socioeconomic group
tend to exercise less sexual restraint than others.93
yet what we know of why marriages endure suggests that sexual
behavior is probably an important factor driving class divisions in mar-
riage, divorce, and extramarital childbearing. Women across the board
still expect monogamy within marriage, and cheating and its results—
including multipartnered fertility—are still potent relationship killers.94 It
is unlikely that many college-educated white women would tolerate open
and flagrant infidelity from their husbands; nor would many remain mar-
ried if their husbands admitted to fathering children by other women. the
relative stability of upper-class marriages—a stability that has increased
in recent decades—suggests that better-off men more often honor
A. Burrington, Racial Differences in Sexual and Fertility Attitudes in an Urban Setting, 6 J.
mARRIAge & FAm. 236, 251 (2006); hymoWItZ, supra note 41, at 103 (describing results from a
University of chicago study of sexual relations in chicago that concluded that “transactional”
sexual relationships, infidelity, domestic violence, and relationships with “concurrent partners”
were significantly more common in a predominantly poor black neighborhood, leading the
authors to conclude that polygamy was that neighborhoods’ “dominant structure.”). See also
oRLAndo PAtteRSon, RItUALS oF BLood (describing sexual aspects of the male inner city “code
of the street.”); Baby Fathers and American Family Formation: Low-Income, Never Married
Parents in Louisiana before Katrina, Ronald mincy and hillard Pouncy, eds., An Essay in the
FUtURe oF the BLAck FAmILy series, center for marriage and Families at the Institute for
American values (2007) 5, 19, 21, (noting that within a Louisiana sample of poor parents that
is more than 0% black, 69% of mothers and 65% of fathers agreed that most
partners “can’t be trusted to be faithful” in a relationship, and “many men indicated that they
did not intend to be faithful to their partner and still considered themselves players in the
dating game.”)
93. See Kathryn Edin & Maria Kefalas, Letter to the Editor, WALL St. J., Sept. 12, [2005]
A17 (objecting to a statement by this author in an opinion page article that “following the
sexual revolution . . . the disparities in family structure suggest that people are not equal in their
ability to handle newfound sexual freedom,” on the grounds that “no sound social science
research we know of backs up this view.”).
94. See edIn & keFALAS, supra note 59; n. BeLIndA tUckeR, the decLIne In mARRIAge
Among AFRIcAn AmeRIcAnS (1995).
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monogamy and strive for sexual fidelity. this doesn’t mean they never
cheat. But how they cheat, and how often, may make all the difference.
As Jonathan Rauch has noted, discretion and hypocrisy are the hall-
marks of middle-class adultery.95 Although these norms are in tension
with the celebration of honesty and autonomy that characterizes our dom-
inant moral outlook, they remain useful instruments of social control.
occasional or hidden lapses are much less destructive of stable families
than notorious liaisons or infidelity as a way of life. Because it is often
difficult to maintain secret relationships within the constraints imposed by
modern employment and family life, a commitment to discretion puts
inherent limits on extramarital adventurism within this milieu.
Likewise, the disruptive practice of multipartnered fertility would seem
to be unusual among educated men. the numbers show that well-heeled
women do not openly bear “love children,” so fathering children simulta-
neously by multiple women—or becoming an out-of-wedlock father at
all—would require privileged men to conduct liaisons across lines of class
or race. there is little evidence that such relationships are commonplace.
nonetheless, the very discretion and restraint that make sexual adventurism
less destructive of better-off families also make actual behavior harder to
document or investigate. therefore, the evidence on these matters is thin.
A recently published paper by two University of Pennsylvania sociol-
ogists supports the inference that the reproductive behavior of well-edu-
cated white men differs drastically from that of men with lower socioe-
conomic status. of the 300 men who had children by more than one
woman in a representative sample of almost 5,000 men aged fifteen to
forty-four, only six percent were college graduates, as compared with
44.5% who completed high school and 24.2% who were high-school
dropouts.96 the paper does not break down information on the marital
status of these men or the children’s mothers by social class. however,
unpublished data gathered by one of the paper’s authors sheds light on
this question. the author states that, given the high rates of marriage
among their most educated fathers (and in contrast to the pattern that data
suggests prevails among those with less education) what little multipart-
nered fertility exists among the college graduates “is most likely entirely
marital”—that is, the result of divorce and a subsequent remarriage rather
than of multiple out-of-wedlock or extramarital liaisons.97 Although this
95. See Jonathan Rauch, Conventional Wisdom: Rediscovering the Social Norms That Stand
Between Law and Libertinism,” 31 ReASon 37 (2000); Rauch, Live and Let Lie, the neW
RePUBLIc, Sept 22, 1997, at 25–26.
96. See guzzo & Furstenberg, supra note 37, at 53–601.
97. Personal e-mail communication from karen guzzo, Sept. 17, 2007 (adding that “in gen-
eral, there is fairly little childbearing outside of marriage among college-educated men compared
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does not directly reveal the incidence of sexual infidelity among the most
elite group, it does indicate that any illicit relationships will not ordinar-
ily result in the birth of children.
In addition to economics and culture, technological change has been
identified as an important impetus for the decline in marriage and increase
in out-of-wedlock childbearing. In a well-known paper published in 1996,
economists Akerlof, yellin, and katz,9 argue that the invention of the
birth control pill in the early 1960s, followed by the legalization of abor-
tion not long after, constituted significant “technological shocks” that
unsettled prior conventions and radically shifted patterns of sexual behav-
ior. By reducing the chance of unwanted pregnancy, contraception and
abortion dramatically increased the number of women willing to have sex
outside of marriage, which made extramarital sex more available to men.
this in turn made men less willing to promise marriage in exchange for
sex or to follow through on that promise in the event of pregnancy.
Because women who became pregnant and wanted to become mothers
had less power to induce men to marry them, the extramarital childbear-
ing rate increased.
the problem with this account is that it fails to explain emerging
social-class disparities. In the wake of the sexual revolution and the
legalization of abortion, premarital sexual activity increased across the
board, but extramarital childbearing did not. Less-educated women
became more willing to bear children out of wedlock—but well-educat-
ed women continued staunchly to resist. disparities also increased by
race.99 What stands in need of explanation is why, in the wake of better
birth-control technology, the demise of shotgun marriage, and the 1960s
shift in mores, some behavioral changes spread throughout society while
others penetrated selectively. Specifically, why have privileged and
well-educated women, especially among the white population, eschewed
to other groups. In another paper I am working on, college educated men make up only 6% of
men with a nonmarital first birth . . .”)
9. george Akerlof, Janet yellin & michael katz, An Analysis of Out-of-Wedlock
Childbearing in the United States, 111 Q. J. econ. 279 (1996).
99. the behavior of well-educated whites suggests an interesting disjunction between prac-
tice and attitudes. Whereas few married persons from any social class would today urge toler-
ance of adultery, single motherhood is not uniformly condemned. A recent public opinion poll
reveals that a substantial minority of the population (about a third) regards bearing children out-
side of marriage either as a positive development or as socially harmless. See Motherhood
Today—A Tougher Job, Less Ably Done, As American Women See It (Survey by Pew Research
center for the People and the Press, released may 9, 1997). Because well-educated individuals
have more tolerant social attitudes generally, persons from privileged sociodemographic groups
may take an even more sanguine view of family diversity—including single motherhood—than
the general population. yet well-educated women almost uniformly fail to practice what they
condone.
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out-of-wedlock childbearing and continued to embrace marriage as a
prerequisite to motherhood?
According to Akerlof and his colleagues, the refusal of respectable
women prior to the invention of the birth control pill to offer premarital
sex with no strings attached created an effective cartel that made extra-
marital sex scarce and kept the practice of shotgun marriage in force. that
cartel was effectively destroyed by the “technological shock” of effective
contraception. Premarital sex became widely available in all sociodemo-
graphic groups. however, there is another norm that prevailed before the
1960s that merits separate consideration: a respectable woman would not
bear and raise a man’s child unless he agreed to marry her.100 that norm
weakened considerably among less-educated women and blacks in the
wake of the sexual revolution, but it survived among upper-middle-class,
educated women and continues in force for that group today.
this analysis shows that the cartel that kept the preexisting regime in
place consisted of two elements: the refusal to have sex except on an
enforceable promise of marriage, and the unwillingness to have children
except within marriage. What Akerlof’s model fails to reveal is why, and
how, upper-middle-class women continue to insist on the second despite
giving up on the first—and why less fortunate women have relinquished
both. Likewise, the model fails to explain why upper-middle-class men
are compliant or complicit in the second demand, but less-privileged men
effectively—and successfully—resist.
these are the very questions that kay hymowitz attempts to answer in
her recent book analyzing changes in family structure by race and class.
According to hymowitz, educated men and women understand that secur-
ing a child’s future educational success and economic well-being in the
current climate requires intensive investment in that child’s development.
Although effective child-rearing has many components, the presence and
day-to-day efforts of two involved parents, and the creation of a stable
family life, are central to this “mission.”101 In other words, well-educated
people seem implicitly to understand that status reproduction requires
marriage and all that goes with it. In the words of sociologist Brad
Wilcox, they “recognize that their lifestyle, and the lifestyle of their chil-
dren, will be markedly better if they form a long-term social and economic
partnership—that is, marriage—with one person.”102 And they seem will-
ing to act on that understanding, despite the considerable effort required.
100. not only were the rates of out-of-wedlock childbearing prior to 1960 far lower than
today, but until roughly the mid-1970s, the vast majority of children born to unmarried mothers
were put up for adoption. See deBoRAh FeSSLeR, the gIRLS Who Went AWAy (2006).
101. hymoWItZ, supra note 41, at 2–.
102. WILcoX, supra note 65, at 244.
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can this account help explain observed class differences in marital and
reproductive behavior? It can be argued that only the most privileged have
both a status worth preserving and the financial means to do so. Perhaps
“the mission is simply too expensive for poor parents to enlist.”103 there
are reasons to doubt that this is the crux of the problem. What strategies
characterize the most successful families? What practices are most effec-
tive in developing children’s “human capital?” there are many unknowns
here, but the fact that children from modest backgrounds (including, most
notably, many recent immigrants) routinely build successful lives,
achieve self-sufficiency, and often improve their economic status signifi-
cantly, suggests that money is not as important as behavior. talking to
children, reading to them, maintaining order and quiet at home, creating
effective expectations and consistent discipline, and exemplifying and
endorsing constructive values, surely are critical. So, it appears, is sus-
taining a successful marriage. All these elements require restraint (includ-
ing sexual restraint), effort, self-control, and an orientation toward the
future. these may be personally costly but do not require a high income.
Although there is no question that having money makes it easier to edu-
cate children and enrich their experience, there is remarkably little evi-
dence that what money can buy actually produces better results. nor is it
clear that the factors that make for success depend on financial resources.
high income correlates with high achievement, but correlation is not cau-
sation. the literature on child development does not prove a causal link
between lots of money and successful child-rearing.104
middle- and upper-middle-class parents’ willingness to sacrifice in the
interest of status reproduction only begs the question of why persons from
other sociodemographic groups are relatively reluctant to take similar
steps to improve their children’s status. Likewise, it is a mystery why so
many less privileged individuals, unlike their better off counterparts, fail
to recognize the advantages of marriage or to modify their behavior to
obtain them. to be sure, there is controversy over whether the poor and
working class can really improve their lives, with many questioning the
potential for upward mobility. however, data on the economic benefits of
marriage, and the experience of groups (including recent immigrants)
with a strong family culture, cast aspersions on these doubts. there is
103. hymoWItZ, supra note 41, at 5.
104. one reason that children from affluent families may do better in school is that merito-
cratic policies have strengthened the link between economic success and intelligence in recent
decades. Intelligence is partly heritable so intelligent, high-income parents tend to have children
who are also are intellectually capable. See, e.g., charles murray, Abolish the SAT, the
AmeRIcAn (July 2007). on the tenuous connection between family income and successful out-
comes for children see SUSAn S. mAyeR, WhAt money cAn’t BUy (1997).
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considerable evidence that marriage produces higher earnings, greater
economic security, stronger and more peaceful communities, and better
behaved and better educated children. those effects are evident at all
levels of education and income. yet many people seem unmoved by these
potential advantages.
As the previous discussion indicates, demographers do not fully under-
stand the origins of recent changes in family structure. the gulfs that have
opened up by class and race are getting wider, and our failure to explain
them hobbles attempts to reduce disparities, strengthen families, and
advance the goals of social and economic equality. After years of research
and policy experiments, social scientists have yet to devise effective
schemes to reverse family disintegration among the most vulnerable
groups in our society.105
Although social scientists have not figured out how to restore the tradi-
tional family, there remains room for disagreement about the proper role
of government in alleviating the resulting inequalities and deprivations.
growing numbers of fatherless, broken, and single-parent families have
prompted calls for new and better-funded programs to support families in
need. these include vigorous child support enforcement, intensive early
childhood education, childcare subsidies, free medical care, and other
resource-intensive measures. Although such proposals have long been on
the table, and implementing them will no doubt improve the lives of many
people, there is no reason to believe that such measures can hold people
harmless for family disintegration. In particular, it is unrealistic to expect
that such interventions will come close to eliminating the relative disad-
vantages suffered by adults and children in nonintact families.
governments cannot easily alleviate the harms that flow from the break-
down of the nuclear family. the strengths of traditional families, and the
well-being of individuals within them, are intrinsic to how those families
actually function. those benefits cannot easily be replicated or conferred
by outsiders. the government cannot replace absent fathers or protect
children from indifferent ones. It cannot reorder the details of family life,
nor can it entirely make up for shortcomings of day-to-day relationships.
In these matters, there is no substitute for moral revival, cultural change,
and behavioral reform.
evidence that differences in outcomes by family type are not inexorably
tied to social class or material resources (and cannot easily be remedied by
providing programmatic support or more funds) can be found in the recent
literature on blended families. Several researchers have recently found that
105. on the ability of government programs to change behaviors surrounding reproduction
and sexuality, see Wax, supra note 3.
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children growing up in such families experience many of the behavioral
problems that beset children from single-parent homes.106 In seeking to
further understand these effects, sociologists have compared conventional
two-parent families to a variety of family combinations consisting of an
adult biological parent living with or married to an unrelated partner.
Although this research is complicated by the plethora of possible arrange-
ments, certain patterns have consistently emerged: as compared with
homes consisting of married parents living with their biological children,
and regardless of education and income, households that include children
living with an unrelated adult are associated with poorer child outcomes
and more problems. differences are found in behaviors such as antisocial
conduct, depression, drug use, and educational attainment.107
What is the explanation for these observations? the answers are cur-
rently a matter of speculation. Problems are especially evident for children
raised in the presence of an unrelated male or stepfather, and a resident bio-
logical father appears to be an important factor enhancing child well-
being.10 these effects may be grounded in men’s evolved interest in their
biological offspring and the importance of the marital tie to men’s con-
structive involvement with child rearing. Alternatively, some observed
effects may reflect selection—that is, possible average differences between
coresident biological fathers and stepfathers. or they may be the product
of dynamics peculiar to different family types. there are in fact good rea-
sons to believe that the ecology of blended families may be less conducive
to effective child-rearing. Stepparent families tend to present a less harmo-
nious and orderly environment than traditional nuclear families. As this
author has previously noted,
Lines of authority and loyalty in blended families are often ambiguous, divid-
ed, and vexed. mothers may feel torn between their biological children and the
demands of their new partners, whose interest in the children may not match
hers. Alternatively, children may feel little need to respect or obey a step-father
or their mother’s male partner, especially if they maintain a relationship with a
biological father who exists outside the relationship and independently exerts
authority over them.109
All told, family structure matters to children’s development. traditional
nuclear families seem to enhance children’s well-being overall, with alter-
106. See ellwood & Jencks, supra note 30, at 3–77; ellwood & Jencks, supra note 6, at
25–65.
107. See hofferth, supra note 59, at 53; ginther & Pollak, supra note 59, at 671. See also
Wax, supra note 1, at 402–12 (reviewing and discussing this literature).
10. See hofferth, supra note 59, at 63 (suggesting, based on her data, that “the achievement
story in two-parent families may be simply about having a biological father [in the home].”)
109. See Wax, supra note 3, at 406.
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native types less successful in producing well-functioning, healthy chil-
dren. no doubt there are excellent families of many types that function
smoothly and raise happy and healthy children. that some families beat the
odds, however, does not mean that the odds are uniform. that risk does not
always produce harm does not change the fact that family structure corre-
lates with outcomes and that these differences contribute to inequalities
between groups.110 Such disparities worsen when nontraditional families
come to dominate within particular communities. the resulting erosion of
norms and expectations further accelerates family decline and undermines
many aspects of community life. What has happened within the black
community—where marriage rates are at a historic low and more than
two-thirds of all births are outside of marriage—is emblematic of these
distressing trends.
do the success rates of different family types have roots in essential,
intransigent aspects of human nature or are they the product of social and
cultural conventions that are contingent and manipulable? the answer
hardly matters at this point. We simply do not know enough about the
sources of these differences to render all families equally effective. nor is
there any evidence that changes in public policy can significantly improve
the functioning of fragile families or contribute to their stability.
Likewise, there is no reason to believe that government can compensate
children and hold them harmless for less than optimal conditions of
upbringing, or assuage the uncertainties, conflicts, and dislocations that
disproportionately afflict fractured families. certainly, it is hard to prove
that public programs cannot accomplish this. that is the challenge, impos-
sible to meet, of proving a negative. hope springs eternal that what is
wrong with broken families can be fixed. that hope is especially strong
among pluralists and diversity advocates who favor the deinstitutionaliza-
tion of conventional marriage and are mistrustful of efforts to buttress,
preserve, and protect traditional forms. however, experience has shown
that the pluralist position carries potential costs—costs most likely to be
visited upon vulnerable members of our society. disparities in family
structure are now adding to other trends that are widening the gap between
rich and poor, and between whites and blacks. Family diversity has
become a potent engine of inequality. that alone is reason to question our
enthusiasm for innovative family forms and to support the revival of mar-
riage and traditional family structures.
110. Id. at 35.

